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SECURE MY DATA OR PAY THE PRICE: 
CONSUMER REMEDY FOR THE NEGLIGENT 
ENABLEMENT OF DATA BREACH 
ABSTRACT 
Every time we swipe our debit cards, pay our bills online, or sign up 
for a service like Netflix, we are entrusting important identifying infor-
mation to the companies with which we do business. Most of the time, those 
companies take seriously the obligation to protect our data and prevent it 
from falling into the hands of those who would use it to benefit themselves 
at our expense. Some companies, however, fail to do enough to meet that 
burden, making it easier for identity thieves to inflict personal and finan-
cial injury on consumers. To date, our legal system has essentially denied 
consumers a remedy against these negligent businesses. 
This Note seeks to explore the problem of data breach and offer solu-
tions for both improving electronic data security and establishing a rem-
edy for consumers. To elaborate on this problem, this Note examines two 
high-profile data breaches: the famous “TJX breach” and the more recent 
breaches suffered by the Sony Corporation. In both of these cases, mil-
lions of customers had their data exposed as a result of a failure to imple-
ment basic security protocols or update existing security models to incor-
porate advances in technology. 
This Note will (1) examine the problem of data breach; (2) articulate 
means of establishing security standards for businesses; (3) argue for fed-
eral codification and regulation of those standards; and (4) argue that con-
sumers should be empowered with a negligence cause of action, grounded 
in the theory of negligence per se, to hold businesses to those standards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consumers today entrust more data than ever before to the companies 
and organizations with which they do business. Credit card numbers, Social 
Security numbers, bank account information, and numerous other forms of 
personal and financial information are all entrusted to businesses during 
the course of the enormous number of transactions that occur each day. 
Often this information is stored on company servers, either as a courtesy 
to the customer or as a requirement of establishing a business relationship 
in anticipation of future transactions. Naturally, these databases of sensi-
tive customer information present an attractive target to computer hackers. 
Often these hackers seek to steal the identities of consumers in order to 
engage in fraudulent transactions in their names. Increasingly, however, 
“hacktivists” seek to expose consumer data to get a business’s attention, 
either to promote a particular cause, or to point out how vulnerable a par-
ticular business’s network is to these kinds of cyber-attacks.1 From a con-
sumer’s point of view, distinguishing between the identity thief and the 
hacktivist is virtually impossible, as once their data is exposed, identity 
theft is a concern regardless of the stated aim of the attackers. 
In response, most companies seek to secure their networks that store 
vital consumer information through various means of electronic defenses 
such as firewalls, intrusion detection protocols, and authentication re-
quirements.2 In some cases, however, companies fail to take adequate 
steps to secure their customer data and their networks are breached, result-
ing in exposure of that data to those who gained access.3 It is at this point, 
of “data breach” but no actual identity theft (i.e., fraudulent transactions), 
that consumers have suffered an injury for which our current legal system 
has, to date, denied them a remedy.4 
                                                 
1 See infra note 17 and accompanying text. 
2 See, e.g., Discover Site Security Measures, DISCOVER BANK, https://www.discover 
.com/credit-cards/member-benefits/security/online-safety/discover-site.html (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2013) (indicating that the Discover website utilizes “128-bit Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL)” encryption which “encodes information sent over the Internet” along with user-
name and password requirements, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems). 
3 See, e.g., Raj Chaudhary et al., Have You Conducted a Data Protection Audit Lately?, 
INTERNAL AUDITOR (Sept. 2011), http://www.theiia.org/intAuditor/feature-articles/2011 
/august/have-you-conducted-a-data-protection-audit-lately/. 
4 See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Extending Learned Hand’s Negligence 
Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 ISJLP 237, 264 (2007) [hereinafter Rustad 
& Koenig, Extending] (“No plaintiff has been successful in receiving an award to 
compensate for lost data where identity theft has not yet occurred.”). 
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This Note argues that consumers should have a negligence cause of ac-
tion in cases of data breach.5 This cause of action should be grounded in a 
negligence per se theory based on federal codification of network security 
standards.6 Part I will further elaborate the problem consumers and busi-
nesses face, focusing on the recent breaches Sony Corporation and its cus-
tomers suffered related to its popular “PlayStation 3” entertainment system, 
along with the widely discussed case of In re TJX Companies Retail Security 
Breach Litigation.7 Part II will highlight the fact that there is virtually no 
mandatory regulation of corporate network security in place today, discuss 
organizations that could serve as the source of standards for adequate net-
work security, and argue that federal regulations should refer to or build 
upon those standards. Part III will discuss the traditional five elements of a 
negligence action: duty, breach, causation, harm, and damages. The negli-
gence action available to consumers should be constructed along the lines 
of Professors Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig’s “negligent enable-
ment of cybercrime,”8 however it should be grounded in a negligence per 
se theory, calling upon the federal regulations discussed in Part II to estab-
lish a business’s duty of care. This negligence action could be labeled 
“negligent enablement of data breach” and should incorporate Rustad and 
Koenig’s toxic tort approach to data breach cases.9 This approach would 
allow consumers to overcome the traditional hurdle they have faced in the 
courts—proving that they have actually suffered harm when no fraudulent 
transactions have been made with their information.10 Part IV of this Note 
will conclude, offering caution that this problem needs to be addressed sooner 
rather than later, with the increasing prevalence of “cloud-computing.”11 
                                                 
5 See id. at 237; see also Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent 
Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1553 (2005) [hereinafter Rustad 
& Koenig, The Tort]. 
6 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining negligence per se as “negligence 
established as a matter of law, so that the breach of the duty is not a jury question. Negligence 
per se usu[ally] arises from a statutory violation.”). 
7 See In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 489, 489 (1st Cir. 2009), amended 
on reh’g in part (D. Mass. 2009); PSN News: Consumer Reports, PLAYSTATION, http://us 
.playstation.com/news/consumeralerts/#us (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
8 See generally Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5. 
9 See Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 264–66. 
10 Id. at 266–70. 
11 See IDC Predicts 2012 Will Be the Year of Mobile and Cloud Platform Wars as IT 
Vendors Vie for Leadership While the Industry Refines Itself, INT’L DATA CORP. (Dec. 1, 
2011), http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS23177411 (predicting that spending 
on “mobile computing, cloud services, social networking, and big data analytics technol-
ogies” would “account for at least 80% of IT spending growth between now and 2020”). 
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I. THE PROBLEM OF DATA BREACH 
A. Elaboration of the Problem 
Data breach and the attendant risk of identity theft affect millions of 
Americans each year.12 In 2011, there were 419 incidents of reported data 
breach resulting in the potential exposure of almost 23 million confiden-
tial records.13 
Many of these reported data breaches are incidents of physical theft, 
such as the theft of a whole computer or its hard drive, or other physical 
data storage devices such as the ubiquitous “thumb drive.”14 Some of these 
data breaches are the result of negligent posting of private information onto 
publicly accessible areas of an organization’s network.15 However, the 
most problematic incidents of data breach are often a result of unauthorized 
intrusion into a business or other organization’s data systems by cyberat-
tackers, more commonly known as hackers.16 In fact, hacking is increas-
ingly seen not only as a way to steal funds or information with which to 
make fraudulent transactions, but also as a way of forcing a business to 
                                                 
12 Jacob W. Schneider, Note, Preventing Data Breaches: Alternative Approaches to 
Deter Negligent Handling of Consumer Data, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 279, 281–82 
(2009) (“In recent years, the risk of identity theft has grown annually at a rapid rate. 
Between 2003 and 2006, the United States saw a fifty percent increase in the number of 
identity theft victims. Today, identity theft affects about fifteen million Americans each 
year.” (footnotes omitted)). 
13 2011 ITRC Breach Report, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR. (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www 
.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/ITRC_Breach_Report_2011_20120207.pdf. 
14 For example, a drive containing over 63,000 personal records was stolen from the 
vehicle of “an employee of Neurological Institute of Savannah & Center for Spine.” Id. at 14. 
15 See id. at 29 (“Yale University has notified about 43,000 faculty, staff, students and 
alumni that their names and Social Security numbers were publicly available via Google 
search for about 10 months.”). The data breach at Yale was evidently the result of the 
decision to store unencrypted personal information on a publicly accessible FTP (File 
Transfer Protocol) server that Google’s automated processes eventually accessed and 
incorporated into their search results. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Yale Warns 43,000 About 
10-Month-Long Data Breach, COMPUTERWORLD (August 22, 2011, 4:54 PM), http:// 
www.computerworld.com/s/article/9219369/Yale_warns_43_000_about_10_month_long
_data_breach. 
16 See 2011 ITRC Breach Report Key Findings, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR. (Mar. 10, 
2011), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/headlines/Breaches_2011.shtml (ac-
cessed by searching the Internet Archive index) (noting that “[h]acking attacks were 
responsible for more than one-quarter (25.8%)” of 2011 data breaches, “hitting a five-
year all time high”) (footnote omitted); see also 2011 ITRC Breach Report, IDENTITY 
THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 13, at 20 (“Betfair says cyberattackers likely gained access 
to the credit and debit details affiliated with 2.3 million customers.”) (emphasis added). 
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take notice of your cause.17 From a consumer point of view, however, dis-
tinguishing between hacktivists and other hackers who intend to access 
consumer personal information for their own gain is virtually impossible, 
and largely academic. Once their information is exposed, the threat of sub-
sequent identity theft, whether by a rogue member of a hacktivist group or 
by a hacker whose goal was theft all along, hangs over the heads of all data 
breach victims. 
B. High Profile Examples of Data Breach: Sony PlayStation and TJX 
All of the above types of data breach are troubling, not only because of 
the sheer volume of sensitive personal information exposed, but also because 
of the fact that such incidents could often have been ameliorated or even 
entirely avoided by employing a minimal amount of modern information se-
curity practices.18 Two stark examples of such failures are the events leading 
to the oft-discussed case of In re TJX Companies Retail Security Breach 
Litigation19 and the more recent attack on Sony Corporation’s “PlayStation 
Network,” serving its popular “PlayStation 3” entertainment system.20 
The facts of TJX represent the worst-case scenario for data breach. Be-
ginning in 2005 and continuing for 18 months, hackers went undetected as 
they accessed TJX’s databases, exposing “at least 45 million credit and 
debit cards to potential fraud.”21 It was eventually discovered that the hackers 
gained access to TJX’s systems by intercepting a retail store’s wireless com-
munications containing information that allowed the hackers to gain access 
to TJX’s central database.22 These hackers were able to accomplish this 
intrusion with relative ease, due to the fact that TJX was using an outdated 
                                                 
17 See Ravi Somaiya & Steve Lohr, Arrest Puts Spotlight on Brazen Hacking Group 
LulzSec, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/technology 
/24hack.html (“[T]he actions of LulzSec fall broadly into the category known as 
hacktivism. Hackers of this type are not motivated by money, but are mainly interested in 
protesting against or antagonizing their targets .... Hacktivists tend to portray their 
activities as digital sit-ins, a form of protest.”). 
18 See Vijayan, supra note 15. Had Yale at least encrypted the data stored on their 
publicly accessible server, even though the files would have still been downloadable by 
outsiders, they would have been much harder to actually open and read. 
19 In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 489, 489 (1st Cir. 2009), amended 
on reh’g in part (May 5, 2009). 
20 See PSN News: Consumer Alerts, PLAYSTATION, supra note 7. 
21 Mark Jewell, Encryption Faulted in TJX Hacking, MSNBC.COM (Sept. 25, 2007), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20979359/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/encryption 
-faulted-tjx-hacking/#.Tqxz2kMg_m0. 
22 Joseph Pereira, Breaking the Code: How Credit-Card Data Went Out Wireless 
Door, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2007, at A1. 
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form of wireless security23 and had failed to take additional security 
measures, such as the installation of firewalls.24 In fact, the hackers “were 
so confident of being undetected that they left encrypted messages to each 
other on the company’s network, to tell one another which files had al-
ready been copied and avoid duplicating work.”25 For consumers however, 
the problems went beyond the mere theft of their confidential and personal 
data. It eventually became known that the hackers were selling consumer 
financial data to gangs of thieves, who used that information to make 
fraudulent purchases.26 
More recently, in the summer of 2011, Sony Corporation and many of 
its subsidiaries were the targets of numerous hacking incidents.27 Most 
notably, hackers brought down the online component of Sony’s popular 
PlayStation 3 entertainment console for approximately one month.28 Sony 
confirmed that name, address, country, email address, birth date, logins 
(usernames and associated passwords), and other data may have been ob-
tained during the breach, and hinted at the possibility that credit card data was 
also obtained in the attack.29 The breach affected over 75 million accounts 
across the world.30 It appears likely that hacktivist group “Anonymous” 
was involved in the attack.31 As of October 2012, class action litigation 
                                                 
23 Id. at A12 (explaining how TJX was using “a flawed encoding system called Wired 
Equivalent Privacy, or WEP” at a time when “the wireless industry was offering a more 
secured system called Wi-Fi Protected Access or WPA, with more complex encryption”). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 For example, one gang, “using bogus credit cards stolen from hundreds of TJX 
customers ... bought $8 million worth of gift cards and used them to buy flat-screen TVs, 
computers and other electronics.” Id. 
27 See PSN News: Consumer Alerts, PLAYSTATION, supra note 7; see also Sonypictures.com 
Data Security Incident, SONY PICTURES (June 8, 2011), http://www.sonypictures.com/corp 
/consumeralert.html. 
28 See PSN News: Consumer Alerts, PLAYSTATION, supra note 7 (notifying consumers 
of the breach and the shutdown of the network between April 17th and 19th); Daniel Ionescu, 
Green Light Is On—Sony PlayStation Network Returns in US, PCWORLD (May 15, 2011, 
9:46 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/227917/green_light_is_on_sony_playstation 
_network_returns_in_us.html. 
29 See PSN News: Consumer Alerts, PLAYSTATION, supra note 7 (“While there is no 
evidence at this time that credit card data was taken, we cannot rule out the possibility.”). 
30 Emily Chung, PlayStation Data Breach Deemed in ‘Top 5 Ever,’ CBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 
2011, 10:56 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2011/04/27/technology-playstation 
-data-breach.html. 
31 Nick Bilton, Sony Explains PlayStation Attack to Congress, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG 
(May 4, 2011, 12:59 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/sony-responds-to 
-lawmakers-citing-large-scale-cyberattack/ (“Although Sony said [in a letter to Congres-
sional Representative Mary Bono Mack] it did not know who was responsible for the 
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does not look promising in terms of providing relief for the affected class 
of PlayStation Network users.32 
Unfortunately for Sony and its customers, the PlayStation Network was 
not the only Sony asset that suffered a data breach in 2011. In June of 2011, 
Sony Pictures Entertainment was attacked, compromising the personal infor-
mation of approximately 37,500 individuals.33 This time, Sony was clear that 
the stolen data did not contain “any credit card information, social security 
numbers or driver license numbers.”34 Troubling, however, is the sugges-
tion by the hackers themselves “that Sony had stored its users’ informa-
tion, including passwords, in plain text, with no encryption whatsoever.”35 
Both TXJ and Sony point out the danger consumers face when companies 
fail to take the proper steps to secure networks holding their data. The Sony 
breach in particular highlights the need for companies to plan their security 
with the assumption that there will be a breach at some point in time. Com-
panies need to keep sensitive consumer data stored in encrypted formats so 
that if hackers do gain access, the data they obtain will be much harder for 
them to use. TJX, on the other hand, shows just how much consumer data 
can be exposed by a failure to keep up with evolving security standards. 
II. SETTING SECURITY STANDARDS 
It is important to understand that though Sony and TJX may have failed 
to implement necessary data security measures, in our current system, they may 
not be entirely to blame for that failure. This is because network and data se-
curity standards are mostly developed either by private organizations36 or 
                                                                                                                         
attacks, the letter said the company believed a group called Anonymous played a role, as 
Sony found files on its servers that said ‘Anonymous’ and ‘We Are Legion.’”). 
32 See Lucile Scott, Judge Dismisses Much of PlayStation Hacking Suit, COURTHOUSE 
NEWS SERVICE (2012), https://www.courthousenews.com/2012/10/19/51486.htm (discuss-
ing District Judge Anthony Battaglia’s dismissal of many of the class claims, including the 
bailment claim, which was dismissed on the grounds that “plaintiffs freely admit, plaintiffs’ 
personal information was stolen as a result of a criminal intrusion of Sony’s Network”). 
33 See SONY PICTURES, supra note 27. 
34 Id. 
35 Nick Bilton, New Questions as Sony Is Hacked Again, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (June 8, 
2011, 7:30 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/new-questions-as-sony-is-hacked 
-again/. 
36 See Software Eng’g Inst., Carnegie Mellon, The CERT® Program FAQ, CERT, 
http://www.cert.org/faq/cert_faq.html (last updated June 20, 2012) (“The CERT Program is 
an organization devoted to ensuring that appropriate technology and systems management 
practices are used to resist attacks on networked systems ....”); Payment Card Industry 
(PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security Assessment Procedures, PCI 
SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL 5 (Oct. 2010), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents 
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by non-regulatory government agencies.37 Thus, companies (at least in most 
fields)38 are not required to implement or even stay up to date with evolving 
data security practices.39 To adequately protect consumers and avoid situa-
tions like Sony, TJX, and the hundreds of other data breaches that occur 
each year, something must be done to motivate companies to pay attention 
to and implement such standards within their own security plans. 
This Note proposes a mixture of government, private, and consumer 
cooperation to accomplish this goal. The result would give consumers the 
power to hold accountable those companies that fail to properly secure 
their personal information. First, we need uniform federal legislation that 
incorporates the work of private organizations and non-regulatory gov-
ernment agencies in the data security field.40 Such legislation would be 
self-updating by simply referring to the work of these organizations and 
agencies as the requisite standard.41 Then, under a theory that companies 
who implement lax data security measures are engaging in unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices,42 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could 
police compliance with these standards.43 This does little, of course, to 
                                                                                                                         
/pci_dss_v2.pdf (“PCI DSS provides a baseline of technical and operational requirements 
designed to protect cardholder data.”). 
37 See Computer Security Division, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., http://nist 
.gov/itl/csd/index.cfm (last updated Jan. 18, 2013) (“The Computer Security Division (CSD), 
a component of NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), provides standards 
and technology to protect information systems against threats to the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information and services.”). NIST is a non-regulatory 
agency. NIST General Information, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., http://www 
.nist.gov/public_affairs/general_information.cfm (last updated May 31, 2012). 
38 See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
39 See Michael E. Jones, Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private 
Sectors, 3 ISJLP 555, 570 (2008) (“Currently no relevant federal legislation concerning 
data breaches involving private entities has passed Congress.”); Robert Sprague & Corey 
Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through 
Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 137 (2009) (“Though 
nearly all the states have enacted data breach notification laws that promote data encryption, 
companies are only obligated to notify individuals if their unencrypted PII [Personal Iden-
tifying Information] has been the subject of unauthorized disclosure.” (emphasis added)). 
40 See infra Part III. 
41 But see Abraham Shaw, Note, Data Breach: From Notification to Prevention Using 
PCI DSS, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 517, 558–59 (2010) (proposing that 
“legislatures should strive to codify the security principles embodied in PCI DSS, rather 
than requiring specific technology, to avoid having to constantly update the law”). 
Shaw’s argument fails to take into account that some attacks can only be prevented by 
specific types or configurations of hardware and software. WPA wireless encryption, for 
example, requires a hardware router that is capable of providing that level of encryption. 
42 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); see also Shaw, supra note 41, at 538. 
43 The FTC is already pursuing this theory but only after breaches occur. Shaw, supra 
note 41, at 538–42. 
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protect consumers who suffer when a company is breached before the 
FTC detects its lax security measures. In such cases, consumers should be 
able to refer to this robust legislation as the basis for a negligence per se 
action against the company. 
A. Existing State and Federal Efforts 
Existing state efforts to combat the problem of data breach focus 
overwhelmingly on notification.44 State notification laws require busi-
nesses “to publicly acknowledge data breaches, alerting affected parties to 
take appropriate precautions.”45 Such laws only allow for civil action if a 
consumer suffers injury because of a company’s failure to notify under the 
statute, not for injury stemming from the underlying data breach.46 Many 
states have used the notification statute adopted by California as a model 
for their own notification law.47 As a result, most states follow California in 
carving out an exception to the notification requirement, allowing breached 
companies to avoid notifying affected consumers “when the lost data was en-
crypted (as opposed to plain-text) or to assist law enforcement.”48 Impor-
tantly, many states also follow California’s example in declaring waiver of 
notification contrary to public policy and therefore void and unenforceable.49 
This prevents consumers from unwittingly giving up their right to notifica-
tion when entering into contractual relationships with companies. 
At the federal level, there is currently no broadly applicable uniform 
legislation that governs data security and notification.50 The statutes that do 
exist only apply to specific situations or fields, such as the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in healthcare,51 or the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in the financial services industry.52 The GLBA, 
as enhanced by the FTC’s “safeguard rule,”53 represents a step in the right 
                                                 
44 See Schneider, supra note 12, at 282 (“With data breach incidents on the rise, forty-
four states have enacted notification statutes.”). 
45 Id. 
46 Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39, at 105; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(b) 
(West 2012). 
47 Schneider, supra note 12, at 282–83. 
48 Id. at 283. 
49 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(a) (West 2012). 
50 Shaw, supra note 41, at 534; see also Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39, at 137 
(“For non-financial web-based activities and transactions there are no direct legal restric-
tions on what companies can do with [Personal Identifying Information] they collect—
particularly the manner in which PII is stored.”). 
51 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.312, 164.502 (2011). 
52 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 16 U.S.C.). 
53 See Shaw, supra note 41, at 537. 
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direction because it requires financial institutions to secure customer in-
formation and notify customers in the event of a breach.54 Aside from being 
applicable only to the financial services industry (and businesses dealing 
with that industry), the GLBA as enhanced by the safeguard rule falls short 
as an ideal uniform regulation because it fails to provide companies with 
any concrete standards, such as particular hardware to install or particular 
security protocols to employ, to ensure customer data is secure. 
B. Sources of Security Standards 
One place companies and other organizations could turn to for such 
standards is the Computer Security Division (CSD), a component of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Information 
Technology Laboratory (ITL).55 The CSD’s security research focuses on 
“emerging technologies” and “new security solutions that will have a high 
impact on the critical information infrastructure.”56 The CSD “[e]valuate[s] 
security policies and technologies from the private sector and national se-
curity systems for Federal agency use” and compiles its research into “a 
specification for minimum security requirements for Federal information 
and information systems.”57 Naturally, the CSD’s work is primarily uti-
lized by the federal government.58 
Another source for computer security standards is Carnegie Mellon 
University’s CERT program. CERT “is an organization devoted to ensuring 
that appropriate technology and systems management practices are used to 
resist attacks on networked systems.”59 The CERT program is federally 
funded,60 and as a result, “the majority of [its] work contributes to govern-
ment and national security efforts.”61 Importantly, however, CERT pub-
lishes many of its tools in an open source format, meaning any organization 
can make use of or even improve upon CERT’s work.62 These tools include 
methods for “discovering vulnerabilities, analyzing network traffic, and 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 See Computer Security Division, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra 
note 37. 
56 Systems & Emerging Technologies Security Research, COMPUTER SEC. DIV., 
COMPUTER SEC. RES. CTR., http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
57 About CSD, COMPUTER SEC. DIV., COMPUTER SEC. RES. CTR., http://csrc.nist.gov 
/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
58 Id. 
59 See Software Eng’g Inst., The CERT® Program FAQ, CERT, supra note 36. 
60 See id. 
61 Software Eng’g Inst., Carnegie Mellon, About Us, CERT, http://www.cert.org/meet 
_cert (last updated Nov. 15, 2011). 
62 Id. 
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facilitating digital investigations,” allowing organizations to improve their 
security by “identifying information security gaps, improving resilience, 
and measuring susceptibility to insider threat.”63 
The research conducted by organizations like the CSD and CERT is 
invaluable in staying up-to-date with the fast moving target of computer 
and network security. Legislative efforts like Gramm-Leach-Bliley need to 
incorporate the work of these groups, so that organizations have some ref-
erence point for securing the data they hold, and so that enforcement ef-
forts, such as those conducted by the FTC, have a framework for assessing 
data security. A good example of what this kind of legislation might look 
like can be found in the privately crafted “Payment Card Industry (PCI) 
Data Security Standard.”64 
C. Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) 
The PCI DSS is developed and updated by the PCI Security Standards 
Council, an organization founded in 2006 by the major payment card 
companies: American Express, Discover, JCB International, MasterCard, 
and Visa.65 PCI DSS was “developed to encourage and enhance cardholder 
data security and facilitate the broad adoption of consistent data security mea-
sures globally. PCI DSS provides a baseline of technical and operational re-
quirements to protect cardholder data.”66 The document “requires all retailers, 
online merchants, data processors, and other businesses that handle credit 
card information” to follow its security and assessment procedures.67 
The “high-level overview” of the DSS outlines twelve requirements, 
including “install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect card-
holder data” and “encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, pub-
lic networks.”68 Importantly, the document also tells participating entities how 
to accomplish these requirements. For example, the use of WEP encryption 
to secure wireless communications (the same encryption TJX had in place 
when it suffered its data breach) is expressly prohibited by the PCI DSS.69 
                                                 
63 Id. 
64 Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security 
Assessment Procedures, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 5. 
65 About Us, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org 
/organization_info/index.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
66 Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security 
Assessment Procedures, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 36. 
67 See Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1588. 
68 Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security 
Assessment Procedures, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 20, 35. 
69 Id. at 36. 
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III. CODIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Perhaps because it is not mandatory,70 some scholars caution that the 
PCI DSS is really an example of industry custom and “is a good test for 
reasonable care only when industry practices do not create unreasonable 
preventable dangers.”71 The concern here seems to be with the (at the 
time) relatively undeveloped standards and best practices of the industry.72 
As it stands today, however, the PCI DSS represents more than industry 
custom. It stands as a model for the federal government to refer to in con-
structing comprehensive legislation, applicable to all companies and or-
ganizations that deal with consumer data. Such legislation would outline 
both detailed technical requirements and general security principles73 that 
are updated and informed by the work of agencies such as the CSD and 
groups such as CERT. 
A. Federal, Not State 
From a consumer protection standpoint, it is important that data security 
standards be set at the federal level, rather than by individual states. Argu-
ments for state standards focus on the states’ traditional laboratory functions 
and their history of leading the way in this area with notification laws.74 It 
has been suggested that “state-created notification laws have effectively 
created a race to the top,” with companies constructing their security plans 
in accordance with the toughest state laws.75 
These arguments fail to take into account that a race to the top for 
companies creates a race to the bottom for those seeking to breach a com-
pany’s networks. Variations in state laws inevitably result in some states 
with weaker standards. If a company primarily does business in a state 
with weaker data security standards, it may wish to avoid the tougher re-
quirements of states in which it does not conduct business, and satisfy only 
the weaker standards. This naturally creates an incentive for hackers and 
other cybercriminals to target companies in these weaker states. This 
                                                 
70 Compliance with the PCI DSS is voluntary and often encouraged through financial 
and operational incentives or consequences put forth by the payment card companies. See 
For Merchants, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org 
/merchants/index.php (follow “What are the consequences to my business if I do not 
comply with the PCI DSS?” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
71 Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1589. 
72 See id. 
73 See Jones, supra note 39, at 570. 
74 See Shaw, supra note 41, at 550–52. 
75 Id. at 550. 
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would lead to a disproportionate number of data breaches affecting those 
consumers unfortunate enough to do business with such companies, even 
though the companies may be following the applicable laws. 
Furthermore, companies and other organizations need clear guidance 
on what exactly they need to do in order to secure consumer data, and 
consumers need a clear benchmark for assessing whether they want to en-
trust those entities with their information.76 A uniform federal law would 
satisfy both of those interests in a more efficient way than a myriad of 
state standards. 
B. Enforcement and Accountability 
As mentioned above in Part II, one way companies are currently held 
accountable for data breaches is through FTC enforcement actions.77 Gen-
erally, the FTC relies on section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,78 
a section that prohibits unfair and deceptive acts or practices.79 The cases 
in which the FTC has employed this theory suggest that the FTC is con-
cerned with at least five inadequate data security practices: 
(1) inadequately assessing system vulnerability to commonly known or 
reasonably foreseeable attacks; 
(2) failing to apply low-cost, simple, and readily available defenses; 
(3) using default user ID or passwords to protect sensitive data rather 
than stronger passwords to prevent hackers; 
(4) storing information in unencrypted files and sending sensitive data 
via unencrypted transmission routes; and 
(5) failing to develop unauthorized access detection mechanisms.80 
Currently, the FTC brings an enforcement action alleging that the 
breached company “failed to provide reasonable and appropriate security 
for the consumer information stored on their network, including credit 
card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes.”81 Often, the company 
                                                 
76 But see id. (arguing that the perceived “race to the top” shows companies have had 
no problem “navigating the maze of state laws to ensure compliance”). 
77 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text; Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39, 
at 138–40. 
78 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
79 See Shaw, supra note 41, at 538–42 (discussing current FTC enforcement efforts). 
80 Id. at 542 (citing Joel B. Hanson, Note, Liability for Consumer Information Security 
Breaches: Deconstructing FTC Complaints and Settlements, 4 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 
11 (2008)). 
81 Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39, at 138 (citing Amended Consolidated Class 
Action Complaint at para. 8, In re Life is Good, Inc. (F.T.C. 2007) (No. 072-3046), http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723046/080117complaint.pdf). 
2013] SECURE MY DATA OR PAY THE PRICE 229 
then signs a consent agreement in which it agrees to “establish and imple-
ment, and thereafter maintain a comprehensive information security pro-
gram that is reasonably designed to protect the security, confidentiality, 
and integrity of personal information collected from or about consumers.”82 
As Robert Sprague and Corey Ciocchetti point out, “[t]he one element 
missing in the FTC complaints and agreements are penalties for non-
compliance.”83 Additionally, the discussion in Part II highlights that both 
companies and consumers need more than nebulous directives to compa-
nies that they secure sensitive data. Both need concrete standards by which 
to assess the strength of security implementations (or lack thereof).84 
More importantly, enforcing data security standards only after a breach 
is simply too late.85 The better approach, in terms of securing consumer 
data, is to have the FTC monitor these companies for compliance with uni-
form federal data security standards before a breach occurs. Naturally, 
however, there remains a gap where data breach can occur before the FTC 
has detected non-compliance. It is at this point that consumers should also 
be able to make use of uniform federal data security standards legislation 
by bringing negligence per se actions against non-compliant companies. 
IV. NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION 
The idea of providing consumers with a negligence cause of action in 
cases of data breach is relatively new. In 2005, Professors Michael L. Rustad 
and Thomas H. Koenig proposed “a new tort of negligent enablement” di-
rected at software venders that produce “defective products and services 
that pave the way for third party cybercriminals who exploit known vul-
nerabilities.”86 Rustad and Koenig outlined all the traditional elements of a 
negligence cause of action87 and even briefly discussed how their pro-
posed tort would fit into a negligence per se framework.88 The negligence 
per se cause of action proposed in this Part will proceed from Rustad and 
Koening’s basic description of the elements and tailor those elements to 
the kind of data breach described in Part I, while also incorporating the 
proposed statutory backbone of Parts II and III. 
                                                 
82 Id. (citing Agreement Containing Consent Order at para. 3, In re Life is Good, Inc. 
(F.T.C. 2007) (No. 072-3046), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723046/080117agreement.pdf). 
83 Id. at 139. 
84 See Shaw, supra note 41, at 550–52. 
85 See Shaw, supra note 41, at 538. 
86 Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1553. 
87 See id. at 1586–1610. 
88 See id. at 1592. 
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A. Duty 
At this point, the duty that should be required of businesses that deal 
with sensitive consumer data should be clear. Similar to the existing duty 
implicit in the FTC enforcement actions,89 businesses should have a legal 
duty to take reasonable care to protect sensitive consumer information 
from unauthorized access.90 As with the duty element of any negligence 
cause of action, one concern here is with the term “reasonable care.”91 
Since this Note seeks to ground the cause of action in a negligence per se 
theory, clarifying the term “reasonable care” as it applies to a company’s 
security policies and implementation is straightforward. Anything that 
falls below the standards set by the kind of uniform federal legislation 
called for in Parts II and III92 will fail to constitute reasonable care. 
The more interesting problem, however, is one shared by all negli-
gence causes of action. Just as some slips and falls are not reasonably 
foreseeable, theoretically there is the possibility of a data breach that no 
one could have reasonably predicted at the time. As Rustad and Koenig 
correctly note, “[a]ny duty to protect computer users from the cybercrimes 
of third persons must be predicated on a preventable risk.”93 This means 
that businesses should not have a duty to guard against innovative breaches 
that have no known or effective defense at the time of the attack.94 Here 
                                                 
89 See Shaw, supra note 41, at 542. 
90 See Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 239–40 (“We argue that companies 
have a duty to provide reasonable information security practices under the common law of 
torts.”); Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39, at 140–41 (“Ultimately, companies must design, 
implement, and maintain adequate security programs to protect PII.” (emphasis added)). 
91 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines reasonable care “[a]s a test of liability for 
negligence, the degree of care that a prudent and competent person engaged in the same line 
of business or endeavor would exercise under similar circumstances.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 240 (9th ed. 2009). 
92 See supra Part II.A–B; see also infra Part IV.B for a discussion of how the material 
discussed in Parts II and III can be synthesized into a workable statute upon which to 
base a negligence per se cause of action. 
93 Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1587; see also Rustad & Koenig, Extending, 
supra note 4, at 251 (“The duty to implement security thwarting third-party cybercrimes 
should turn on whether the crime was foreseeable.”). 
94 The instances of such indefensible breaches are rare. This is likely due to the 
overlapping nature of security systems. For example, in December of 2011, Columbia 
researchers discovered a vulnerability in HP LaserJet printers that “could allow hackers 
to remotely control printers over the internet.” Kevin Parrish, HP Issues Firmware to 
Address Printer Vulnerability, TOM’S GUIDE (Dec. 28, 2011, 6:00 AM), http:// 
www.tomsguide.com/us/Columbia-University-HP-LaserJet-Printer-Exploit,news-13671.ht
ml. HP acknowledged the vulnerability but indicated that “no customer [had] reported 
unauthorized access.” Id. This is likely due to the fact that a basic firewall (present in 
virtually all home routers and requiring little to no user interaction to ensure protection) 
would protect against the attack. Id. 
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too, grounding this action in negligence per se affords some aid to both con-
sumers seeking relief, and courts seeking to adjudicate post-data breach 
claims. In addition to setting a security standards floor, constructing legis-
lation centered on the work of agencies like the CSD and organizations 
like CERT95 also provides a measure of what it means for an attack to be 
innovative enough to fall outside the reasonableness standard. If an attack 
is so new that not even computer security experts could have anticipated it, 
absent further negligence on the part of the breached company,96 one should 
be extremely hesitant in holding that company liable for the breach.97 
More importantly, the notion that businesses only have a duty to guard 
against foreseeable risks of data breach places a burden on consumers to 
guard against breach as well. Consumers should take the time to evaluate 
the security policies of the specific companies with which they do busi-
ness online and understand good Internet security practices in general.98 In 
the short term this may lessen the incidence of “phishing” attacks, in which 
unwary users are lured into putting sensitive information (such as bank 
login usernames and passwords) into fake sites posing as the legitimate site 
the user is trying to access.99 For example, many sites use a form of Internet 
security known as “Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure” (HTTPS).100 To put 
it simply, HTTPS is a means of securing online communications between 
                                                 
95 See supra Part II.B. 
96 For example, if a cybercriminal is able to make use of something like the 
vulnerability in the HP printers in a corporate setting, a consumer would still have a 
negligence cause of action under the theory proposed by this Note. The argument would 
be that the company failed to properly configure their firewall to protect against the 
possibility that other systems on their network (such as the flawed printer, or more likely, a 
server housing consumer data) may be vulnerable. 
97 This may seem unfair to consumers, as they are forced to bear the loss for something 
no one could have foreseen. It may be a moot point however because, as indicated above, 
such incidents should be incredibly rare. See supra Part II.B. 
98 See Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39, at 136 (“Consumers should possess at 
least some of the responsibility for learning as much as they can about any website that 
requires their PII submissions.”). 
99 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines phishing as “[t]he sending of a fraudulent 
electronic communication that appears to be a genuine message from a legitimate entity 
or business for the purpose of inducing the recipient to disclose sensitive personal 
information.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1263 (9th ed. 2009). 
100 For an in-depth explanation, see Beginners Guide to SSL Certificates: Making the 
Best Choice When Considering Your Online Security Options, VERISIGN (2010), http://www 
.verisign.com/ssl/ssl-information-center/ssl-resources/guide-ssl-beginner.pdf. VeriSign, 
now part of Symantec, makers of the popular Norton Antivirus, is a massive player in the 
online security business, responsible for providing validation services for over 4.5 billion 
daily hits. SYMANTEC, https://www.symantec.com/ssl-certificates (follow “Advantages” 
tab) (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
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a consumer’s Internet browser and a company’s website.101 If a hacker in-
tercepts the communication, he or she will be hard-pressed to access the 
information it contains.102 In that way, HTTPS is similar in concept to using 
a code language that only you and a friend know to exchange traditional 
paper correspondence. Consumers can easily identify websites that utilize 
HTTPS by looking for a small padlock,103 or for part of the website’s name 
to be highlighted in green.104 If a consumer knows their financial site is 
supposed to utilize HTTPS, yet they do not see the padlock or green text, then 
they will know that they are being targeted for a phishing scam. Alterna-
tively, if the consumer knows the site they are on is legitimate, yet they do 
not see any indication that the site utilizes HTTPS, then they know the site 
is not secure and they should not communicate their sensitive information. 
The burden on consumers to educate themselves and implement good 
Internet security practices is not meant as a device for allowing businesses 
to shrug off their duty of care. Quite the opposite, the burden on consumers 
should provide greater incentive to businesses to discover risks and notify 
consumers of them, so as to be able to make the argument that consumers 
should have been aware of the danger.105 For example, should a company 
discover that impersonating emails are being sent to consumers directing 
them to fraudulent sites in an attempt to steal their information, the com-
pany should immediately send out an alert to all potential victims.106 If 
after receiving this notice (and assuming no other negligence on the part of 
the company), a consumer falls victim to the scam anyway, the company 
should not be held liable for the consumer’s failure to do his or her own 
part in securing their data. 
                                                 
101 Beginner’s Guide to SSL Certificates, VERISIGN, supra note 100, at 4. 
102 See HTTPS, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pages/https (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2013). The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a nonprofit organization that 
holds itself out as “confront[ing] cutting-edge issues defending free speech, privacy, inno-
vation, and consumer rights today” in the online world. About EFF, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/about (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
103 Beginner’s Guide to SSL Certificates, VERISIGN, supra note 100, at 3. 
104 Id. 
105 At least one commentator sees this kind of increased incentive as a cause for con-
cern. See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private 
Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 263–64 (2007) (“Even 
if the result is economic waste, actors might adopt excessive, and perhaps inefficient, 
precautions in a negligence regime in order to bolster their claim to have exercised due 
care should litigation arise.”). This is exactly the kind of effort we want to encourage 
because of the rapidly changing nature of technology and the diligence of cybercriminals. 
106 For an example of this practice in the federal government, see Consumer Alerts, 
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/alerts/ (last updated 
Jan. 30, 2013). 
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At this point, it should be mentioned that the classic Hand formula107 
is an inappropriate method to establish duty in this context.108 One fear 
with the use of the Hand formula is that it would “deter businesses from 
engaging in electronic commerce altogether.”109 Practically speaking, all 
the Hand formula provides in this context is a dollar amount that compa-
nies should be spending on network security to avoid liability. Because of 
the high potential for data breach110 and the likelihood of high resulting 
damages,111 that figure may be more than even the wealthiest companies 
could afford.112 Furthermore, the Hand formula provides no real guidance 
to actually securing a network, beyond throwing as much money as possi-
ble at the problem. 
B. Breach 
As indicated throughout this Note, breach should be determined on a 
negligence per se theory.113 Rustad and Koenig viewed negligence per se 
as a possibility in creating their tort of negligent enablement of cybercrime 
in the software context.114 They discuss three factors for determining 
whether adopting a statute as the standard of care is appropriate: “(1) Does 
the statute provide specific guidance on the standard of care? (2) Was the 
                                                 
107 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (presenti-
ng the formula as B<PL where B equals “the burden of adequate precautions,” P equals 
the probability of harm, and L equals “the gravity of the resulting injury”). 
108 For a discussion of the Hand formula in the electronic security context, see Rustad & 
Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 239–40 (arguing that “[t]he best analytical approach 
for crafting this new duty involves determining whether the burden of a comprehensive 
security solution is less than the magnitude of the damages caused by lost or stolen data, 
multiplied by the probability of occurrence.”). But see Schneider, supra note 12, at 298–300 
(“The usefulness of this formula in data breach cases depends on our ability to estimate its 
variables properly.”). 
109 Schneider, supra note 12, at 299–300 (fearing that “the Hand Formula would yield 
the same result as imposing strict liability”). 
110 See id. at 299 (“Nearly one in four Americans will have their data exposed each cal-
endar year.” (citing Steve Lohr, Surging Losses, but Few Victims in Data Breaches, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/27/technology/circuits/27lost.html)). 
111 See Schneider, supra note 12, at 299–300. 
112 This explains Schneider’s fear of the Hand formula essentially imposing strict lia-
bility. See id. Since no one could ever afford to pay as much for data security as the Hand 
formula would require, in virtually every case the company would be found negligent and 
the cause of action would fail to guide or promote conduct in any meaningful way. 
113 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
114 See Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1593–94 (“If statutes were enacted 
specifying a given level of computer security, users could use the violation of that 
statutory standard of care as a potent surrogate for negligence.”). 
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statute enacted to protect against the harm suffered by the plaintiff? and 
(3) Was the plaintiff included in the class protected by the statute?”115 
Then, as now,116 “there [was] little by way of legislative guidance on 
what constitutes reasonable security.”117 The PCI Security Standards Council 
was in its infancy118 and the PCI DSS was just emerging as a model on which 
to base the kind of legislation needed for a negligence per se cause of action.119 
As seen in Parts II and III, the PCI DSS is now well-established.120 When 
continually updated with research from the other organizations described in 
Part II,121 and supplemented by the federal enforcement efforts described 
in Part III,122 the legislation that emerges is exactly the kind of legislation 
that meets Rustad and Koenig’s three criteria.123 Such legislation would 
certainly provide guidance on the standard of care companies would need 
to meet to guard consumer data; indeed, the PCI DSS as it exists now al-
ready provides exactly this sort of guidance.124 The statute could easily be 
enacted to directly address the problem of data breach, as opposed to try-
ing to fit the negligence per se action under some other statute such as 
HIPPA or the GLBA.125 Finally, since the statute would outline what com-
panies needed to do to secure consumer data, consumers would have no 
trouble in successfully arguing that they were encompassed by the statute’s 
protection. This provides support that a negligence per se action is sustain-
able under such a legislative regime. Under this theory, consumers could 
establish breach by pointing to a company’s failure to comply with the 
standards set forth in the adopted legislation. 
                                                 
115 Id. at 1593. 
116 See supra Part II.B. 
117 Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1593. 
118 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
119 Version 1.1 of the PCI DSS was released in September of 2006. Payment Card Industry 
(PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security Assessment Procedures, PCI SEC. 
STANDARDS COUNCIL, 1 (Sept. 2006), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/pci 
_dss_v1-1.pdf; see also supra Part II.C. PETER SILVA, COMPLYING WITH PCI DSS 3–4 (2012), 
available at http://www.f5.com/pdf/white-papers/complying-pci-dss-wp.pdf. 
120 For example, according to a 2010 PCI DSS compliance study undertaken by Verizon, 
out of 200 organizations assessed, 49 percent were at least 90 percent PCI DSS compliant. 
Verizon 2010 Payment Card Industry Compliance Report, VERIZON 4, 7 (2010), available 
at http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_2010-payment-card-industry -com 
pliance-report_en_xg.pdf. 
121 See supra Part II.B. 
122 See supra Part III. 
123 See Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 239–40. 
124 See Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security 
Assessment Procedures, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 5. 
125 For the problems with using HIPPA or the GLBA as the basis for a negligence per 
se cause of action, see Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1594–97. 
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C. Causation 
As with many negligence causes of action, the basic argument for cau-
sation in this context should be that, but for a company’s failure to comply 
with the legislated standards and properly secure consumer data, the plain-
tiff’s data would not have been exposed, thereby causing injury to the 
plaintiff.126 The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 431 states that: 
“The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his 
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”127 As Rustad and 
Koenig rightly point out, “[i]t may be difficult to determine whether a soft-
ware bug, security hole, or a misconfiguration was a ‘substantial factor’ if 
the security breach was connected to multiple potential causes.”128 Ideally, 
this should be an issue for the finder of fact to resolve.129 The plaintiff in 
this type of negligence per se data breach case should be able to begin by 
pointing to a part of the defendant company’s (the company holding the 
consumer’s data) security that failed to meet the legislative standards. The 
burden should then be on the defendant company to provide a reason as to 
why a third party in charge of that particular piece of software or security 
component is really the one responsible for the flaw.130 
D. Harm and Damages 
As a result of the ethereal nature of data breaches, consumers do not 
suffer the physical injuries that plague many unfortunate tort victims.131 
                                                 
126 For this argument in the software context, see Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra 
note 5, at 1600–01 (“In a negligent enabling case, a plaintiff will need to demonstrate a 
causal connection (cause-in-fact) between software defects and consequential or direct 
damages suffered .... The ‘but-for’ test would determine ‘whether the defendant’s 
conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s harm.’” (footnote omitted)). 
127 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965); see also Rustad & Koenig, The 
Tort, supra note 5, at 1601 (“The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted a ‘substantial 
factor’ test that only requires that the defendant materially contribute to a computer 
intrusion or internet security breach.”). 
128 Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1601. 
129 See id. at 1602 (“In a computer security case, the plaintiff must present facts and 
circumstances that will convince a jury that the cybercrime that caused the plaintiff’s 
injury was facilitated by the data handler or software vendor.”). 
130 For an example of this argument in the context of HIPPA, see id. at 1595 (“Health 
care providers punished for such unauthorized disclosures of individually identifiable 
health information should be able to seek indemnification against a software vendor 
whose products or services paved the way for the wrongful disclosure.”). 
131 See Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1603 (“The predominant injury in 
a cybertort case will be a financial loss, dignitary injury, or invasion of privacy rather 
than personal injury or death.”). 
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The data breach victim suffers harm in the form of “increased risk of iden-
tity fraud, fear of identity fraud, and cost of efforts to reduce their risk of 
identity fraud,” analogous to the toxic tort categories of “enhanced risk, 
fear of future harm, and medical monitoring.”132 Arguments on these theories 
of harm have failed to gain much traction in the courts.133 Enhanced risk is 
hard for plaintiffs to prove as a matter of mathematical probability—the 
correlation between information obtained from data breach and actual in-
stances of identity theft is surprisingly low, comprising only 1.5% to 4% 
of all identity theft reports.134 Fear of future harm falls into the category of 
emotional harms courts have found “too speculative to confer standing.”135 
Costs of efforts to reduce the risk of actual identity theft, generally in the 
form of credit monitoring services,136 are seen as distinguishable from med-
ical monitoring costs in toxic tort cases. Credit monitoring is seen as a pre-
ventive measure, to avoid future theft from intervening third-party use of 
the stolen data, whereas medical monitoring costs are seen as efforts at 
early diagnosis and treatment of a more likely medical harm.137 All of these 
problems lead to conclusions like that of Judge Ripple in the Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
132 James Graves, “Medical” Monitoring for Non-Medical Harms: Evaluating the 
Reasonable Necessity of Measures to Avoid Identity Fraud After a Data Breach, 16 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 2, 5–6 (2009). 
133 See id.; Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 264 (“No plaintiff has been 
successful in receiving an award to compensate for lost data where identify theft has not 
yet occurred.”). 
134 See Schneider, supra note 12, at 288 (citing Steve Lohr, Surging Losses, but Few 
Victims in Data Breaches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09 
/27/technology/circuits/27lost.html). 
135 Graves, supra note 132, at 6 (citing Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796–98 
(M.D. La. 2007) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims, including fear and apprehension of fraud, 
on the grounds they did not constitute recoverable damages)); Randolph v. ING Life Ins. 
& Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs’ claim of 
substantial risk of harm of identity theft failed to amount to more than speculation); 
Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020–21 (D. Minn. 2006) 
(granting defendant company’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s failure to 
articulate present injury); Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No. CIV. 05-668 
RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *3–6 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) (holding plaintiff’s claim 
deficient for failing to provide evidence that data was ever held or used with intent to 
commit unlawful activity). 
136 See Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 113, 113 (2011) (“In this type of arrangement, a business reviews 
information, generally on a daily basis, from one or more of the major credit-reporting 
agencies. When a change in the data subject’s credit history occurs, such as the 
unauthorized opening of a new account in the victim’s name, the service alerts the 
[victim].”). 
137 See Graves, supra note 132, at 28. 
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case Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp,138 that “[w]ithout more than alle-
gations of increased risk of future identity theft, the plaintiffs have not suf-
fered a harm that the law is prepared to remedy.”139 
There is no simple solution to this “present injury”140 barrier that data 
breach plaintiffs face in pursuing their claims. In some sense, courts need 
to come around to the idea that simply having your data in unauthorized 
hands, outside of your control, is an injury that occurs entirely separate 
from actual fraudulent transactions.141 While the readily measurable costs 
of this injury may be small, in the form of credit monitoring costs (often 
provided by the breached company anyway, in an effort to build goodwill 
after a breach)142 and costs to secure replacement financial and identifica-
tion cards such as driver’s licenses, there is also an emotional component 
not captured in these costs. Plaintiffs deserve the recognition of the fact 
that they now have to deal with the overhanging fear that they will transi-
tion from data breach victims to full-blown identity theft victims143 and 
the fact that they were let down by a company they entrusted with their 
sensitive data as a present, immediate, and compensable injury. 
Assuming the present injury barrier can be overcome, plaintiffs face 
another hurdle in the form of the Economic Loss Rule.144 In short, the 
Economic Loss Rule operates to preclude recovery when the parties have a 
                                                 
138 Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 640 (7th Cir. 2007). 
139 Id. at 639. 
140 See Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 264–66 (discussing the present 
injury barrier as an obstacle plaintiffs face in pursuing their claims when data breach has 
resulted in a loss of their data yet no actual identity theft has occurred). 
141 See Johnson, supra note 136, at 141. 
142 Id. at 125–28 (citing numerous examples of breached companies providing 
anywhere from one to three years of free credit monitoring to affected consumers, 
including Sony in the PlayStation breach discussed in Part I.B). Indeed, as a result of 
increased incentive presented by the kind of suits proposed by this Note, virtually all 
companies may come to automatically provide credit monitoring costs. This should not 
preclude action however, because credit monitoring does nothing to ease consumer fear 
of actual identity theft that may not appear on credit reports, such as opening accounts or 
obtaining services that do not require a credit check. See Defend: Recover from Identity 
Theft, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/de 
fend.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
143 Indeed, this overhanging fear is precisely why commentators analogize data breach vic-
tims to medical monitoring cases. See Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 264–65 
(“The victims of a widespread data theft such as the TJX case could form a ‘monitoring 
class’ roughly paralleling consumers implanted with a defective medical device that has 
not yet injured them.”). 
144 Id. at 268 & n.139 (pointing out that even if the present injury barrier can be 
overcome, “courts permit no recovery for purely economic losses” and that “plaintiffs 
have not been successful in side-stepping the ELR in negligent data handling cases”). 
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direct contractual relationship and damages are consequential (lost profits), 
rather than direct (property damage or personal injury).145 As Vincent Johnson 
persuasively argues, however: 
In large measure, the economic loss rule is intended to further the pri-
vate ordering of business transactions. However, data-security statutes 
in many states hold that private agreements disclaiming legislatively 
imposed obligations related to computerized personal information are 
not enforceable and are void as against public policy. Consequently, the 
duties at issue in cybersecurity cases are, in large measure, not a proper 
subject for private ordering. For this reason ... the economic loss rule 
should not foreclose recovery of credit-monitoring damages.146 
Unfortunately, as Johnson points out, not all courts have adopted this view 
in data breach cases.147 
If, however, plaintiffs can successfully overcome both the present injury 
and economic loss rules, their damages should not be limited merely to 
recovery of credit monitoring costs148 and similar compensatory items. 
Perhaps more importantly, punitive damages should also be available to 
data breach plaintiffs. Data breach represents the perfect scenario for one 
of the basic rationales behind punitive damages: incentivizing citizens to 
bring suit when compensatory harm is relatively low but we, as a society, 
still wish to punish the harmful activity.149 Additionally, punitive damages 
would serve a function of tort law that is often left behind in modern jurispru-
dence: the public expression of outrage at the actions of the tortfeasor.150 
                                                 
145 Id. at 267; see also Johnson, supra note 136, at 122. 
146 Johnson, supra note 136, at 122–23 (footnotes omitted); see also Danielle Keats 
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1816 (2010) (“These 
financial injuries have much in common with economic harm long redressed under other 
branches of tort law.”). 
147 Johnson, supra note 136, at 123 (citing Paul v. Providence Health System–Oregon, 
240 P.3d 1110 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that data breach plaintiffs could not recover 
credit monitoring costs because they constituted purely economic damages)). 
148 But see Graves, supra note 132, at 50–58 (arguing that an economic analysis 
assuming even the most expensive costs of actual identity theft and the highest 
probability of actual identity theft occurring suggests that it is not economically rational 
to purchase credit monitoring in the case of data breach). 
149 See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE 
L.J. 347, 366–67 (2003). 
150 See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409 (2009) (“Damages are designed 
not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, 
to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury 
to the action itself” (quoting Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498–99 (C.P. 1763))). 
2013] SECURE MY DATA OR PAY THE PRICE 239 
CONCLUSION 
As it stands today, consumer protection and relief after the fact from 
data breach is woefully inadequate. Companies are left to their own devices 
when it comes to securing sensitive consumer information, and as a result 
they often create systems that practically beg to be exploited by savvy 
hackers. The time is ripe for the federal government to step in and level 
the playing field by carefully constructing standards that allow consumers 
to have confidence that the companies with which they choose to do busi-
ness are using reasonable and effective methods to secure their data.151 
Should that confidence prove misplaced, however, and should companies 
slip under the enforcement radar, consumers should not be left to bear the 
cost. By allowing consumers to hold companies like Sony and TJX account-
able for negligent data security practices, we add another layer of incen-
tive for companies to meet their duty of care. Consumers should not be 
denied access to courts merely because some unknown third party has not 
used their data in a detrimental way. The fact is that when consumer data 
is stolen, it is stolen from consumers, not the companies holding the data. 
It is at that point that consumers have suffered an injury, and it is at that 
point they should be allowed to hold responsible the company that made 
that injury possible. 
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